"Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining" (with Christopher W. Blair), International Organization, Vol. 74, No. 4 (2020), pp. 872-895.
[Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Replication Data] [Appendix] [Washington Post Article] 

abstract

As more women attain executive office, it is important to understand how gender dynamics affect international politics. Toward this end, we present the first evidence that gender stereotypes affect leaders’ abilities to generate audience costs. Using survey experiments, we show that female leaders have political incentives to combat gender stereotypes that women are weak by acting “tough” during international military crises. Most prominently, we find evidence that female leaders, and male leaders facing female opponents, pay greater inconsistency costs for backing down from threats than male leaders do against fellow men. These findings point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Namely, female leaders are better able to tie hands—an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means female leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our findings have critical implications for debates over the effects of greater gender equality in executive offices worldwide.

 
​"Who's Prone to Drone? A Global Time-Series Analysis of Armed Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Proliferation" (with Michael C. Horowitz & Matthew Fuhrmann), Conflict Management and Peace Science.
[​Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Replication Data] [Appendix] [Foreign Affairs Article] [Washington Post Article]

abstract

What determines whether countries pursue and obtain armed drones? Using an original time-series dataset, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of armed drone proliferation from 1994 to 2019. We theorize and find evidence that security threats—like terrorism—are not the only factors driving proliferation. Regime type also has a significant effect, but it varies over time. From 1994 to 2010 regime type had no significant effect. However, non-democracies became significantly more likely to pursue and obtain armed drones from 2011 to 2019 owing to China’s entrance into the drone export market, which asymmetrically eased supply-side constraints for non-democracies. We also find that status-seeking states are more likely to pursue armed drones. Our results contribute to the broader academic literature on proliferation by demonstrating how supply shocks can lead to changes in proliferation trends over time and lending further credence to the importance of prestige in international politics.