"Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counter-Productive? Evidence from 18 Countries" (with Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz), Forthcoming, International Studies Quarterly.
Abstract
Do armed drone programs decrease or increase terrorism? Existing studies on this question produce conflicting arguments and evidence. Drone optimists contend that possessing armed drones reduces a country’s vulnerability to terrorism, while pessimists claim that this military technology provokes higher levels of terrorism. Prior research focuses almost exclusively on one particular context: the short-term effect of the U.S. drone program in Pakistan. However, armed drones have proliferated rapidly over the last decade and 18 countries now possess this technology. We expand the scope of prior studies by leveraging new data to assess how obtaining armed drones changed the degree to which all drone possessors experienced terrorism between 2001 and 2019. Employing a variety of estimation strategies, including two-way fixed effects, we find that armed drone programs are associated with significant reductions in terrorism. Our analysis, based on the full universe of cases over an 18-year period, provides further evidence that drones can be effective as a counter-terrorism tool in some cases.
"The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders" (with Christopher W. Blair & Jonathan A. Chu), Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 66, No. 4-5 (2022), pp. 677-703.
[Publisher's Version][Ungated PDF] [Appendix][Political Violence at a Glance Article]
abstract
Prominent research holds that the use of weapons of mass destruction is taboo. But how strong are these norms? Investigating this question among the mass public, we argue that some citizens actually support taboo policies in private but are unwilling to express counter-normative opinions openly due to fear of social sanction. These insincere norm-holders are difficult to identify empirically because they are observationally equivalent to sincere norm-holders in direct-question surveys. To overcome this challenge, we use a list design, which allows survey respondents to indirectly express sensitive opinions. The results from three list experiments show that between 10% and 17% of Americans falsify their preferences over chemical weapons use when asked directly. In an extension, we explore our framework in the realm of nuclear weapons and elite behavior. Our findings advance a specific debate on the strength of weapons taboos, while our conceptualization of insincere norm-holders and methodological application have broader implications for how scholars might think about and measure norms in international politics.
"Who's Prone to Drone? A Global Time-Series Analysis of Armed Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Proliferation" (with Michael C. Horowitz & Matthew Fuhrmann), Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2022), pp. 119-142.
[Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Replication Data] [Appendix] [Foreign Affairs Article] [Washington Post Article]
abstract
What determines whether countries pursue and obtain armed drones? Using an original time-series dataset, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of armed drone proliferation from 1994 to 2019. We theorize and find evidence that security threats—like terrorism—are not the only factors driving proliferation. Regime type also has a significant effect, but it varies over time. From 1994 to 2010 regime type had no significant effect. However, non-democracies became significantly more likely to pursue and obtain armed drones from 2011 to 2019 owing to China’s entrance into the drone export market, which asymmetrically eased supply-side constraints for non-democracies. We also find that status-seeking states are more likely to pursue armed drones. Our results contribute to the broader academic literature on proliferation by demonstrating how supply shocks can lead to changes in proliferation trends over time and lending further credence to the importance of prestige in international politics.
"Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining" (with Christopher W. Blair), International Organization, Vol. 74, No. 4 (2020), pp. 872-895.
[Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Replication Data] [Appendix] [Washington Post Article]
abstract
As more women attain executive office, it is important to understand how gender dynamics affect international politics. Toward this end, we present the first evidence that gender stereotypes affect leaders’ abilities to generate audience costs. Using survey experiments, we show that female leaders have political incentives to combat gender stereotypes that women are weak by acting “tough” during international military crises. Most prominently, we find evidence that female leaders, and male leaders facing female opponents, pay greater inconsistency costs for backing down from threats than male leaders do against fellow men. These findings point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Namely, female leaders are better able to tie hands—an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means female leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our findings have critical implications for debates over the effects of greater gender equality in executive offices worldwide.