"To Compete or Strategically Retreat? The Global Diffusion of Reconnaissance Strike." 2025. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 62, No. 4 (with Michael C. Horowitz).
[Open Access PDF] [Appendix] [War on the Rocks Article]
[Open Access PDF] [Appendix] [War on the Rocks Article]
ABSTRACT
The reconnaissance strike complex is synonymous with modern modern military power, and prominent realist theories would have predicted rapid proliferation after its successful debut in the Gulf War. Instead, the complex has proliferation slowly. To explain this puzzle, we theorize that interstate security threats significantly impact proliferation, but not in the way traditionally presumed. Although the literature on weapons proliferation has largely assumed a monotonically increasing relationship should hold between the capabilities of a state's adversaries a state's own capability, we draw from the economics literature and game theoretic insights from political science to argue that the relationship should resemble an inverted-U. When states have rivals with moderate reconnaissance strike capabilities, they have security incentives to compete with them. However, when states face highly advanced adversaries, it becomes more difficult to escape or match their competition, making symmetrical acquisition less appealing. While most prior research focuses on narrower aspects of the reconnaissance strike complex like missiles or smart bombs, we test our theory on a novel dataset tracking country-level acquisition of eight aspects of the complex from 1980-2017: ballistic missiles; bombers; cruise missiles; fighter aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; precision-guided munitions; satellites; and submarines. We find strong support for our inverted-U argument. States that have rivals with moderate reconnaissance strike capabilities have over double the reconnaissance strike capabilities themselves than states that have rivals with very low or very high capabilities. Our findings hold for broader measures of the complex that closely proxy a state's general military capabilities, narrower measures of the complex, and alternative measures of general military sophistication, indicating our theory has broad applicability. This article explains why some states invest heavily in conventional capabilities despite an already-large lead over their adversaries, and why other states instead opt to invest in alternatives rather than balancing symmetrically.
"Us and Them: Foreign Threat and Domestic Polarization." 2025. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 62, No. 2-3 (with Dominic Tierney).
[Publisher's Version] [Pre-Print PDF] [Appendix] [Replication]
abstract
Can foreign threats reduce domestic polarization and, if so, under what conditions? This is an important question for the United States given the severity of internal division and the emergence of China as a potentially unifying external peril. We offer a novel theoretical argument about when external danger will rally Americans based on the nexus between the vividness of foreign danger and bipartisan elite agreement about the nature of the threat. We test our theory through a series of survey experiments. We find that even vivid foreign threats do not reduce domestic polarization and therefore the threat from China alone may not be sufficient to spur domestic unity. However, vivid foreign threats in combination with policymaker agreement about the nature of the threat does significantly reduce domestic polarization. This reduction in polarization does come at a cost: increased public willingness to violate use of force norms against China. Overall, our study establishes that foreign peril can reduce domestic polarization under certain circumstances, and demonstrates that how elites react to foreign threats is highly important in shaping wider domestic effects.
"Popcorn and Politics: A Course on American Foreign Policy and Film." 2025. Journal of Political Science Education.
[Publisher's Version] [Pre-Print PDF] [Syllabus]
ABSTRACT
Integrating film into traditional political science courses can provide powerful benefits. Most notably, it can increase student excitement about and thus engagement with a course. This paper offers an in-depth guide for how to construct a rigorous, but engaging, course on American foreign policy through the lens of film. Each week of the course includes one class session on a key American foreign policy event, along with a theory and/or debate associated with it. These sessions are organized chronologically so that students learn about the historical development of American foreign policy over time, in addition to theory. The second class session in any given week pairs the American foreign policy event/debate with a germane film that—either directly or metaphorically—relates to the foreign policy substance and can help students learn about it at a deeper level. I select a wide range of different types of movies—from musicals and satirical comedies to war dramas and science-fiction films—to interest different types of students. Empirical evidence suggests the structure and content of the course was highly effective at better engaging students than a conventional political science class and teaching them about the interlinked relationship between film and foreign policy.
"When Foreign Countries Push The Button." 2024. International Security, Vol. 48, No. 4.
[Publisher's Version] [Pre-Print PDF] [Appendix] [Lawfare Article] [MIT Press Article]
ABSTRACT
How strong are the constraints against nuclear use? Pessimistically, experimental studies find a majority of citizens in multiple major powers would approve of nuclear strikes by their own government. But what if the nuclear taboo only begins at the water’s edge when individuals evaluate the use of nuclear weapons by a foreign government? Many policymakers believe that the international reaction to nuclear use would be severe, especially among allies, but prior studies have not tested this assumption. This paper develops a theory of how variation in the identity of who conducts nuclear attacks conditions the constraints against nuclear use. It posits that support for nuclear use should be higher when conducted by domestic and allied governments compared to other foreign countries because it will be perceived as more ethical. A series of four survey experiments in the U.S. and India provide evidence for this theory. However, in contrast to the expectations of many policymakers, approval is not significantly less for allies or strategic partners than it is for domestic governments. Absolute support for nuclear attacks is also alarmingly high, even when it is foreign countries pushing the button. On balance, these findings are inconsistent with the existence of a nuclear taboo.
"Fossil Fuel Divestment and Public Climate Change Policy Preferences: An Experimental Test in Three Countries." 2024. Environmental Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1 (with Paul Lendway and Abolfazl Nuri).
[Publisher's Version] [Open Access PDF] [Replication Data]
Abstract
Divestment is a prominent strategy championed by activists to induce positive social change. For example, the current fossil fuel divestment movement includes over 1,500 institutions that control $40 trillion in assets. A primary pathway through which divestment is theorized to be effective is by influencing public beliefs and policy preferences, thus pressuring policymakers to take action. However, prior research only tests this argument via qualitative case studies. We assess the impact of exposure to information about fossil fuel divestment on public beliefs and policy preferences through the use of national survey experiments in three major greenhouse gas emitters: the United States, India, and South Africa. Across a range of different types of treatments, we find surprisingly little evidence that exposure to information about the fossil fuel divestment movement can increase public support for policies that address climate change. Our findings suggest that divestment movements may be less effective at changing beliefs and policy preferences than previously realized.
"Dracarys: Unleashing the Lessons of Nuclear Conflict from House of the Dragon." 2024. Journal of Political Science Education.
[Publisher's Version] [Pre-Print PDF]
ABSTRACT
Given increasing nuclear-related dangers in the real world, which pose an existential threat to humanity, teaching nuclear theory to students is critically important. I argue that the hit TV show House of the Dragon can be utilized to educate students on the nuances of nuclear theory in a fun and engaging—but also surprisingly rigorous—way. In particular, the fire-breathing weapons of mass destruction in the Game of Thrones prequel show illustrate five key lessons about nuclear conflict dynamics. First, nuclear war is incredibly destructive and causes significant psychological trauma to survivors of nuclear attacks. Second, nuclear weapons can induce caution in leaders and deter major war. Third, while a powerful force, nuclear deterrence can fail due to irrational leaders, principle-agent problems, and accidents. Fourth, nuclear compellence is harder than nuclear deterrence and can backfire. Fifth, nuclear superiority beyond a secure second-strike capability provides little strategic benefit. In sum, House of the Dragon offers a more modern option than classics like Dr. Strangelove to teach about nuclear theory.
"The Gendered Peace Premium." 2023. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (with Christopher W. Blair).
[Publisher's Version] [Pre-Print PDF] [Appendix/Replication] [Lawfare Article]
ABSTRACT
The adage that "only Nixon could go to China" suggests hawkish leaders face fewer domestic political barriers to pursuing conciliation with foreign adversaries. Since hawks are viewed as less ideologically predisposed to peace than doves, their efforts at rapprochement are more likely to be perceived as in the national interest. We explore how this conventional wisdom intersects with prominent gender stereotypes about women's role in national security. Do gender stereotypes that women are inclined towards peace make it more difficult for women leaders to pursue conciliation? In a series of survey experiments, we find evidence of a gendered peace premium. That is, a penalty women leaders face for pursuing peace. When women leaders seek rapprochement with foreign adversaries, they are perceived as acting "according to type." Consequently, women's conciliatory policy proposals are viewed as less likely to be in the national interest than identical policies pursued by male leaders. Partisanship dynamics significantly moderate the gendered peace premium, and policy success can attenuate women leaders' disadvantage. While this discriminatory dynamic does not make it impossible for women leaders to seek and achieve peace, it does make it more difficult and politically costly than some perspectives assume.
"Madman or Mad Genius? The International Benefits and Domestic Costs of the Madman Strategy." 2023. Security Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2., pp. 271-305.
[Publisher's Version] [Open Access PDF] [Appendix] [Responsible Statecraft Article]
Abstract
According to the “Madman Theory” outlined by Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas Schelling, and embraced by Richard Nixon and Donald Trump, being perceived as mad can help make seemingly incredible threats—like starting a nuclear war—more credible. However, recent research has largely concluded that the Madman Theory does not work. In this study, I theorize that the international benefits of the Madman Theory have been underestimated, but also that there are significant domestic barriers associated with adopting such a strategy that undermine its effectiveness. Through a series of five novel survey experiments, I find evidence that perceived madness does provide limited advantages in coercive bargaining vis-à-vis foreign adversaries, but also entails significant domestic costs that potentially erode its efficacy. Overall, this study provides clearer support for the Madman Theory than most previous literature has found, but also breaks new theoretical ground by analyzing the domestic politics of perceived madness.
"Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counterproductive? Evidence from Eighteen Countries." 2022. International Studies Quarterly, Vol 66, No. 3 (with Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz).
[Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Appendix] [Washington Post Article]
Abstract
Do armed drone programs decrease or increase terrorism? Existing studies on this question produce conflicting arguments and evidence. Drone optimists contend that possessing armed drones reduces a country’s vulnerability to terrorism, while pessimists claim that this military technology provokes higher levels of terrorism. Prior research focuses almost exclusively on one particular context: the short-term effect of the U.S. drone program in Pakistan. However, armed drones have proliferated rapidly over the last decade and 18 countries now possess this technology. We expand the scope of prior studies by leveraging new data to assess how obtaining armed drones changed the degree to which all drone possessors experienced terrorism between 2001 and 2019. Employing a variety of estimation strategies, including two-way fixed effects, we find that armed drone programs are associated with significant reductions in terrorism. Our analysis, based on the full universe of cases over an 18-year period, provides further evidence that drones can be effective as a counter-terrorism tool in some cases.
"The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders." 2022. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 66, No. 4-5, pp. 677-703 (with Christopher W. Blair and Jonathan A. Chu).
[Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Appendix] [Political Violence at a Glance Article]
abstract
Prominent research holds that the use of weapons of mass destruction is taboo. But how strong are these norms? Investigating this question among the mass public, we argue that some citizens actually support taboo policies in private but are unwilling to express counter-normative opinions openly due to fear of social sanction. These insincere norm-holders are difficult to identify empirically because they are observationally equivalent to sincere norm-holders in direct-question surveys. To overcome this challenge, we use a list design, which allows survey respondents to indirectly express sensitive opinions. The results from three list experiments show that between 10% and 17% of Americans falsify their preferences over chemical weapons use when asked directly. In an extension, we explore our framework in the realm of nuclear weapons and elite behavior. Our findings advance a specific debate on the strength of weapons taboos, while our conceptualization of insincere norm-holders and methodological application have broader implications for how scholars might think about and measure norms in international politics.
"Who's Prone to Drone? A Global Time-Series Analysis of Armed Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Proliferation." 2022. Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 119-142 (with Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew Fuhrmann).
[Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Replication Data] [Appendix] [Foreign Affairs Article] [Washington Post Article]
abstract
What determines whether countries pursue and obtain armed drones? Using an original time-series dataset, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of armed drone proliferation from 1994 to 2019. We theorize and find evidence that security threats—like terrorism—are not the only factors driving proliferation. Regime type also has a significant effect, but it varies over time. From 1994 to 2010 regime type had no significant effect. However, non-democracies became significantly more likely to pursue and obtain armed drones from 2011 to 2019 owing to China’s entrance into the drone export market, which asymmetrically eased supply-side constraints for non-democracies. We also find that status-seeking states are more likely to pursue armed drones. Our results contribute to the broader academic literature on proliferation by demonstrating how supply shocks can lead to changes in proliferation trends over time and lending further credence to the importance of prestige in international politics.
"Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining." 2020. International Organization, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 872-895 (with Christopher W. Blair).
[Publisher's Version] [Ungated PDF] [Replication Data] [Appendix] [Washington Post Article]
abstract
As more women attain executive office, it is important to understand how gender dynamics affect international politics. Toward this end, we present the first evidence that gender stereotypes affect leaders’ abilities to generate audience costs. Using survey experiments, we show that female leaders have political incentives to combat gender stereotypes that women are weak by acting “tough” during international military crises. Most prominently, we find evidence that female leaders, and male leaders facing female opponents, pay greater inconsistency costs for backing down from threats than male leaders do against fellow men. These findings point to particular advantages and disadvantages women have in international crises. Namely, female leaders are better able to tie hands—an efficient mechanism for establishing credibility in crises. However, this bargaining advantage means female leaders will also have a harder time backing down from threats. Our findings have critical implications for debates over the effects of greater gender equality in executive offices worldwide.