

**Who's Prone to Drone?
A Global Time-Series Analysis of
Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Proliferation**

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Online Appendix

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Robustness Tests

Logit Models

To ensure our results are robust to different model specifications, in Table A1 we estimate logistic models (using odds ratios) that control for time dependence using the cubic polynomial approach (Carter and Signorino, 2010), as well as a variable that counts how many total countries have pursued or acquired armed UAVs in the previous year. All of our main results related to regime type and status-seeking hold in these models.

Table A1: Logit Analysis of Armed UAV Proliferation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy (All Years)	1.499 (0.564)			5.129*** (2.242)		
Non-Democracy (Before China Shock)		0.737 (0.443)			1.670 (1.558)	
Non-Democracy (After China Shock)			3.041** (1.354)			9.283*** (5.495)
Status-Seeking	3.051*** (1.169)	3.109*** (1.171)	3.109*** (1.171)	0.789 (0.780)	0.732 (0.740)	0.732 (0.740)
Terrorism	1.334*** (0.120)	1.278*** (0.119)	1.278*** (0.119)	1.575*** (0.175)	1.455*** (0.158)	1.455*** (0.158)
Interstate Threats	1.235*** (0.0869)	1.284*** (0.102)	1.284*** (0.102)	1.344*** (0.119)	1.397*** (0.108)	1.397*** (0.108)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.288*** (0.349)	2.269*** (0.355)	2.269*** (0.355)	2.588*** (0.490)	2.462*** (0.511)	2.462*** (0.511)
Non-Pursuit Years	0.186*** (0.0347)	0.166*** (0.0344)	0.166*** (0.0344)			
Non-Pursuit Years ²	1.168*** (0.0262)	1.182*** (0.0285)	1.182*** (0.0285)			
Non-Pursuit Years ³	0.996*** (0.000638)	0.995*** (0.000666)	0.995*** (0.000666)			
Pursuit Count	1.177*** (0.0252)	1.209*** (0.0344)	1.209*** (0.0344)			
Period 2		0.255*** (0.0825)			14.24** (17.15)	
Non-Democracy X Period 2		4.125** (2.488)			5.558* (5.368)	
Period 1			3.923*** (1.270)			0.0702** (0.0846)
Non-Democracy X Period 1			0.242** (0.146)			0.180* (0.174)
Non-Acquis Years				0.124*** (0.0535)	0.203*** (0.0607)	0.203*** (0.0607)
Non-Acquis Years ²				1.233*** (0.0579)	1.146*** (0.0369)	1.146*** (0.0369)
Non-Acquis Years ³				0.994*** (0.00125)	0.996*** (0.000939)	0.996*** (0.000939)
Acquis Count				1.535*** (0.0384)	1.317*** (0.0883)	1.317*** (0.0883)
Constant	0.0000273*** (0.0000432)	0.0000385*** (0.0000638)	0.00000982*** (0.0000172)	0.000000969*** (0.00000196)	0.00000184*** (0.00000419)	0.0000262*** (0.0000773)
Observations	4067	4067	4067	4194	4194	4194
Pseudo R ²	0.686	0.692	0.692	0.756	0.775	0.775

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cox Models

To further ensure our results are robust to different model specifications, in Table A2 we estimate Cox proportional-hazards models. All of our main results are robust to the use of these models. Moreover, and the Akaike and Bayesian information criterion (AIC and BIC) are much higher for these models than they were for the Weibull models in Table 1 in the main text, which indicates that the Weibull models are a better fit for the data.

Table A2: Cox Analysis of Armed UAV Proliferation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy (All Years)	1.763* (0.532)			5.222*** (2.911)		
Non-Democracy (Before China Shock)		0.615 (0.294)			1.064 (1.252)	
Non-Democracy (After China Shock)			3.948*** (1.806)			7.900*** (5.747)
Status-Seeking	3.657*** (1.219)	3.939*** (1.346)	3.939*** (1.346)	0.858 (0.731)	0.886 (0.729)	0.886 (0.729)
Terrorism	1.533*** (0.111)	1.481*** (0.110)	1.481*** (0.110)	1.310*** (0.128)	1.300*** (0.126)	1.300*** (0.126)
Interstate Threats	1.351*** (0.115)	1.368*** (0.114)	1.368*** (0.114)	1.440*** (0.180)	1.397*** (0.160)	1.397*** (0.160)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.077*** (0.244)	2.062*** (0.247)	2.062*** (0.247)	1.769*** (0.264)	1.766*** (0.272)	1.766*** (0.272)
Period 2		2.716 (.)			106.1 (.)	
Non-Democracy X Period 2		6.425*** (4.180)			7.423 (9.923)	
Period 1			0.161 (.)			0.133 (.)
Non-Democracy X Period 1			0.156*** (0.101)			0.135 (0.180)
Observations	3826	3826	3826	4086	4086	4086
AIC	383.8	377.8	377.8	191.7	191.5	191.5
BIC	415.0	415.3	415.3	223.3	229.4	229.4

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Regime Type

Subsetting

To probe the robustness of our regime type results, we subset the data into two periods: 1994 to 2010 and 2011 to 2019. Models 1 and 3 in Table A3 demonstrate that from 1994 to 2010 there was no significant effect of regime type, as hypothesized. However, it is important to note that model 3 reports that non-democracies were an astounding 320 times more likely than democracies to acquire armed UAVs during Period I. This finding is a result of the fact that only three countries—the US, Israel, and the UK—acquired armed drones before 2011. Therefore, with so few observations that succumbed to the hazard in this period (19 countries *pursued* armed UAVs from 1994 to 2010), coding decisions make a huge difference. For example, while the US and the UK are strong democracies, according to Polity, Israel is coded as a 6 and so is right on the edge. Thus, if you move the threshold for democracy down to 6, model 3 reports that democracies were significantly and substantively more likely to acquire armed UAVs than non-democracies during Period I. Essentially, the results in model 3 likely reflect our contention that democracies are, generally, more technologically advanced. During this early adoption period, only the most technologically advanced countries could produce their own armed drones. Israel and the US are two of the most technologically advanced countries in the world, and the UK was only able to acquire armed UAVs from the US.

Models 2 and 4 in Table A3 demonstrate that from 2011 to 2019 non-democracies were significantly and substantively more likely to pursue and acquire armed UAVs than democracies, as hypothesized.

Table A3: Analyzing the Effect of Regime Type by Subsetting

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition
	1994-2010	2011-2019	1994-2010	2011-2019
Non-Democracy	0.770 (0.463)	4.698*** (2.180)	320.1 (1206.3)	8.724*** (6.766)
Status-Seeking	1.084 (0.758)	5.821*** (2.405)	1.37e-09*** (4.68e-09)	1.087 (0.969)
Terrorism	1.702*** (0.240)	1.422*** (0.128)	11.42*** (9.523)	1.336** (0.162)
Interstate Threats	1.373*** (0.135)	1.019 (0.278)	2.740* (1.642)	1.234 (0.336)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.366*** (0.452)	1.899*** (0.291)	880.3*** (1898.7)	1.664*** (0.258)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	3.389*** (1.121)	2.612* (1.490)	15.46*** (8.070)	5.851*** (1.568)
Observations	2642	1184	2712	1374
<i>AIC</i>	87.73	65.65	13.33	61.54
<i>BIC</i>	128.9	101.2	54.67	98.12

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Changing the Polity Cut-Point for Democracy

In Table A4, we change our threshold for democracy by coding a country as democratic if their Polity score is 6 or above (as opposed to 7). Note that in model 5, when Israel is coded as a democracy, the model is unable to generate standard errors. Only three countries—the US, Israel, and the UK—acquired armed drones before 2011. Thus, when the Polity cut-point is lowered to 6, all countries that acquired during Period I are coded as democratic, and so there is not sufficient variation in regime type to fully estimate the model. In any case, our main results are robust to this change.

Table A4: Analyzing the Effect of Regime Type by Changing the Polity Cut-Point

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy (All Years)	1.715*			3.638**		
	(0.502)			(1.883)		
Non-Democracy (Before China Shock)		0.434			5.42e-08	
		(0.250)			(.)	
Non-Democracy (After China Shock)			4.091***			6.291***
			(1.852)			(4.172)
Status-Seeking	3.628***	3.604***	3.604***	0.694	0.678	0.678
	(1.221)	(1.192)	(1.192)	(0.670)	(.)	(0.641)
Terrorism	1.505***	1.441***	1.441***	1.361***	1.328	1.328***
	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.143)	(.)	(0.139)
Interstate Threats	1.313***	1.344***	1.344***	1.551***	1.524	1.524***
	(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.240)	(.)	(0.205)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.006***	1.984***	1.984***	1.726***	1.696	1.696***
	(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.242)	(.)	(0.238)
Period 2		0.240**			0.265	
		(0.170)			(.)	
Non-Democracy X Period 2		9.425***			115982280.9	
		(7.051)			(.)	
Period 1			4.162**			3.767
			(2.940)			(3.239)
Non-Democracy X Period 1			0.106***			8.62e-09***
			(0.0794)			(6.99e-09)
Constant	4.82e-08***	2.25e-08***	5.41e-09***	8.12e-11***	2.40e-10	6.36e-11***
	(7.74e-08)	(6.36e-08)	(1.81e-08)	(2.02e-10)	(.)	(2.23e-10)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.545***	3.061***	3.061***	4.524***	4.561	4.561***
	(0.406)	(0.895)	(0.895)	(0.775)	(.)	(0.883)
Observations	3826	3826	3826	4086	4086	4086
AIC	157.9	150.4	150.4	82.40	61.43	79.43
BIC	201.6	206.7	206.7	126.6	61.43	136.3

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Continuous Polity Measure

Table A5 utilizes the continuous Polity measure instead of the binary measure used in Table 1. Recall that the higher the Polity score, the more democratic a country is. Thus, the fact that the coefficient on POLITY in models 3 and 6 is below 1 implies that democracies were *less* likely to pursue and acquire armed drones than non-democracies from 2011 to 2019, as we hypothesized.

Table A5: Analyzing the Effect of Regime Type by Using the Continuous Polity Measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Polity (All Years)	0.957** (0.0197)			0.893*** (0.0265)		
Polity (Before China Shock)		1.072 (0.0499)			1.231 (0.219)	
Polity (After China Shock)			0.902*** (0.0268)			0.865*** (0.0274)
Status-Seeking	3.521*** (1.179)	3.536*** (1.172)	3.536*** (1.172)	1.067 (0.880)	1.142 (0.883)	1.142 (0.883)
Terrorism	1.547*** (0.115)	1.519*** (0.119)	1.519*** (0.119)	1.446*** (0.150)	1.429*** (0.151)	1.429*** (0.151)
Interstate Threats	1.304*** (0.101)	1.352*** (0.121)	1.352*** (0.121)	1.552*** (0.233)	1.554*** (0.192)	1.554*** (0.192)
Logged GDP Per Capita	1.998*** (0.222)	1.897*** (0.224)	1.897*** (0.224)	1.756*** (0.270)	1.656*** (0.249)	1.656*** (0.249)
Period 2		0.987 (0.701)			5.010 (7.889)	
Polity X Period 2		0.842*** (0.0470)			0.703* (0.127)	
Period 1			1.013 (0.720)			0.200 (0.314)
Polity X Period 1			1.188*** (0.0663)			1.422* (0.258)
Constant	7.41e-08*** (0.000000113)	1.20e-08*** (3.47e-08)	1.19e-08*** (4.08e-08)	8.79e-11*** (2.32e-10)	1.14e-11*** (4.79e-11)	5.71e-11*** (2.34e-10)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.539*** (0.402)	3.211*** (0.932)	3.211*** (0.932)	4.696*** (0.847)	4.988*** (1.061)	4.988*** (1.061)
Observations	3741	3741	3741	4001	4001	4001
AIC	153.5	143.5	143.5	76.56	73.55	73.55
BIC	197.1	199.5	199.5	120.6	130.2	130.2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Freedom House

In Tables A6 and A7, we use a different measure of regime type, from Freedom House, to test the robustness of our regime type results.¹ Table A6 utilizes a binary measure of regime type from Freedom House and Table A7 employs the continuous Freedom House measure, where higher scores indicate a country is less “free” or less democratic. While our results related to H2 remain robust to the use of Freedom House, models 2 and 5 in both tables indicate that regime type had a statistically significant effect from 1994 to 2010. Specifically, they suggest that democracies were more likely to pursue and acquire armed drones than non-democracies during Period I. This provides some evidence against H1.

Table A6: Analyzing the Effect of Regime Type with a Binary Freedom House Measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy (All Years)	1.020 (0.424)			3.105* (1.853)		
Non-Democracy (Before China Shock)		0.324** (0.163)			0.000000133*** (8.47e-08)	
Non-Democracy (After China Shock)			2.781* (1.620)			7.825** (6.490)
Status-Seeking	3.507*** (1.230)	3.903*** (1.424)	3.903*** (1.424)	0.771 (0.730)	0.764 (0.704)	0.764 (0.704)
Terrorism	1.508*** (0.120)	1.468*** (0.117)	1.468*** (0.117)	1.318*** (0.141)	1.297** (0.140)	1.297** (0.140)
Interstate Threats	1.325*** (0.104)	1.377*** (0.119)	1.377*** (0.119)	1.605*** (0.242)	1.577*** (0.202)	1.577*** (0.202)
Logged GDP Per Capita	1.873*** (0.249)	1.916*** (0.253)	1.916*** (0.253)	1.761*** (0.259)	1.738*** (0.255)	1.738*** (0.255)
Period 2		0.185** (0.141)			0.108** (0.109)	
Non-Democracy X Period 2		8.589*** (5.854)			58955500.7*** (55376579.4)	
Period 1			5.416** (4.127)			9.293** (9.400)
Non-Democracy X Period 1			0.116*** (0.0794)			9.59e-09*** (8.81e-09)
Constant	9.58e-08*** (0.000000178)	2.45e-08*** (7.12e-08)	4.52e-09*** (1.56e-08)	3.42e-11*** (9.99e-11)	7.77e-11*** (2.57e-10)	8.37e-12*** (3.24e-11)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.587*** (0.405)	3.204*** (0.926)	3.204*** (0.926)	4.721*** (0.808)	4.978*** (1.007)	4.978*** (1.007)
Observations	3826	3826	3826	4086	4086	4086
AIC	160.5	153.0	153.0	85.50	79.33	79.33
BIC	204.3	209.3	209.3	129.7	136.2	136.2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

¹ “Freedom in the World,” *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/content/freedom-world-data-and-resources>.

Table A7: Analyzing the Effect of Regime Type with the Continuous Freedom House Measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Freedom House (All Years)	1.117 (0.0950)			1.383** (0.189)		
Freedom House (Before China Shock)		0.811* (0.0966)			0.437* (0.203)	
Freedom House (After China Shock)			1.359*** (0.160)			1.578*** (0.222)
Status-Seeking	3.565*** (1.228)	4.000*** (1.434)	4.000*** (1.434)	0.672 (0.689)	0.663 (0.676)	0.663 (0.676)
Terrorism	1.495*** (0.112)	1.473*** (0.115)	1.473*** (0.115)	1.340*** (0.135)	1.320*** (0.140)	1.320*** (0.140)
Interstate Threats	1.303*** (0.105)	1.351*** (0.116)	1.351*** (0.116)	1.518** (0.269)	1.486*** (0.205)	1.486*** (0.205)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.045*** (0.249)	2.009*** (0.254)	2.009*** (0.254)	1.878*** (0.293)	1.786*** (0.276)	1.786*** (0.276)
Period 2		0.0986*** (0.0845)			0.0322*** (0.0358)	
Freedom House X Period 2		1.675*** (0.265)			3.611*** (1.682)	
Period 1			10.14*** (8.690)			31.10*** (34.59)
Freedom House X Period 1			0.597*** (0.0945)			0.277*** (0.129)
Constant	3.43e-08*** (6.11e-08)	2.26e-08*** (6.48e-08)	2.23e-09*** (7.51e-09)	1.83e-11*** (5.48e-11)	4.64e-10*** (1.63e-09)	1.49e-11*** (5.98e-11)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.555*** (0.406)	3.136*** (0.910)	3.136*** (0.910)	4.590*** (0.802)	4.623*** (1.041)	4.623*** (1.041)
Observations	3826	3826	3826	4086	4086	4086
<i>AIC</i>	159.0	150.5	150.5	82.83	77.68	77.68
<i>BIC</i>	202.8	206.8	206.8	127.0	134.5	134.5

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Shifting the Time Periods

Table A8 examines the robustness of our regime type results by shifting the cutoff between the first and second periods up and down by a year. For example, models 1 and 5 elongate Period II by having it last from 2010 to 2019, while models 3 and 7 shorten Period II by having it last from 2012 to 2019. Our results remain robust to these changes.

Table A8: Analyzing the Effect of Regime Type with Alternate Period Cutoffs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pursuit Period 2 Elongated	Pursuit Period 1 Elongated	Pursuit Period 2 Shortened	Pursuit Period 1 Shortened	Possession Period 2 Elongated	Possession Period 1 Elongated	Possession Period 2 Shortened	Possession Period 1 Shortened
Non-Democracy (Before China Shock)	0.504 (0.274)		0.657 (0.325)		0.923 (1.147)		0.892 (1.109)	
Non-Democracy (After China Shock)		4.095*** (1.973)		3.845*** (1.751)		8.331*** (6.122)		8.353*** (6.179)
Period 2	0.218* (0.180)		0.304* (0.217)		0.135* (0.139)		0.637 (0.653)	
Non-Democracy X Period 2	7.625*** (5.374)		6.233*** (4.240)		9.046 (12.35)		9.338 (12.73)	
Status-Seeking	3.870*** (1.334)	3.946*** (1.372)	3.946*** (1.372)	3.870*** (1.334)	0.628 (0.623)	0.687 (0.649)	0.687 (0.649)	0.628 (0.623)
Terrorism	1.463*** (0.106)	1.460*** (0.107)	1.460*** (0.107)	1.463*** (0.106)	1.337*** (0.137)	1.324*** (0.132)	1.324*** (0.132)	1.337*** (0.137)
Interstate Threats	1.348*** (0.114)	1.342*** (0.111)	1.342*** (0.111)	1.348*** (0.114)	1.549*** (0.228)	1.505*** (0.201)	1.505*** (0.201)	1.549*** (0.228)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.039*** (0.244)	2.038*** (0.247)	2.038*** (0.247)	2.039*** (0.244)	1.845*** (0.294)	1.818*** (0.286)	1.818*** (0.286)	1.845*** (0.294)
Period 1		3.290* (2.353)		4.594* (3.803)		1.569 (1.608)		7.424* (7.651)
Non-Democracy X Period 1		0.160*** (0.109)		0.131*** (0.0924)		0.107 (0.146)		0.111 (0.151)
Constant	1.46e-08*** (4.01e-08)	7.97e-09*** (2.35e-08)	2.62e-08*** (6.43e-08)	3.18e-09*** (1.08e-08)	9.05e-12*** (2.75e-11)	6.17e-10*** (2.12e-09)	9.69e-10*** (2.76e-09)	1.22e-12*** (4.44e-12)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	3.130*** (0.951)	2.858*** (0.786)	2.858*** (0.786)	3.130*** (0.951)	5.421*** (0.939)	3.636*** (0.826)	3.636*** (0.826)	5.421*** (0.939)
Observations	3826	3826	3826	3826	4086	4086	4086	4086
AIC	151.4	153.3	153.3	151.4	80.22	79.29	79.29	80.22
BIC	207.6	209.6	209.6	207.6	137.1	136.1	136.1	137.1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controlling for an Alliance with the US and Differences in UN Ideal Points

In Table A9, we control for whether a country has a defense pact with the United States using data from Version 4.01 of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP).² Given the high correlation between US ALLY and NON-DEMOCRACY (− 0.56) and the real-world relationship between the two concepts, it is important to control for the former in order to avoid any possible omitted variable bias. We also include a variable measuring the absolute difference in UN voting ideal points between a country and the US in order to control for foreign policy preferences (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Our results related to regime type remain robust to the inclusion of these additional control variables, and they also hold for other control variables like nuclear possession.

Table A9: Controlling for an Alliance with the United States and UN Voting Ideal Points

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy (All Years)	1.981 (1.022)			8.139*** (6.052)		
Non-Democracy (Before Chinese Shock)		0.671 (0.510)			1.765 (2.367)	
Non-Democracy (After Chinese Shock)			4.142** (2.286)			12.64** (13.05)
Status-Seeking	2.918*** (1.156)	3.456*** (1.483)	3.456*** (1.483)	0.306 (0.310)	0.330 (0.331)	0.330 (0.331)
Terrorism	1.483*** (0.110)	1.451*** (0.107)	1.451*** (0.107)	1.341*** (0.138)	1.344*** (0.140)	1.344*** (0.140)
Interstate Threats	1.299*** (0.115)	1.320*** (0.126)	1.320*** (0.126)	1.553*** (0.190)	1.479*** (0.184)	1.479*** (0.184)
Logged GDP Per Capita	1.941*** (0.220)	1.979*** (0.233)	1.979*** (0.233)	1.755*** (0.254)	1.777*** (0.269)	1.777*** (0.269)
US Ally	0.647 (0.260)	0.651 (0.260)	0.651 (0.260)	0.309** (0.148)	0.331** (0.155)	0.331** (0.155)
Difference in UN Ideal Point from US	0.768 (0.166)	0.800 (0.174)	0.800 (0.174)	0.464** (0.154)	0.461* (0.195)	0.461* (0.195)
Period 2		0.247* (0.193)			0.252 (0.314)	
Non-Democracy X Period 2		6.170** (4.585)			7.165 (9.725)	
Period 1			4.054* (3.178)			3.969 (4.948)
Non-Democracy X Period 1			0.162** (0.120)			0.140 (0.189)
Constant	0.000000127*** (0.000000247)	4.33e-08*** (0.000000129)	1.07e-08*** (3.82e-08)	4.59e-11*** (1.31e-10)	6.35e-11*** (2.25e-10)	1.60e-11*** (6.75e-11)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.600*** (0.442)	3.079*** (0.913)	3.079*** (0.913)	5.265*** (0.744)	5.466*** (1.183)	5.466*** (1.183)
Observations	3738	3738	3738	3989	3989	3989
AIC	155.3	151.1	151.1	76.05	78.15	78.15
BIC	211.3	219.6	219.6	132.7	147.4	147.4

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

² Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815–1944. *International Interactions* 28: 237-260.

Excluding Countries that Imported from China

In table A10, we exclude from our analysis countries that imported from China in order to further probe whether our results depend on the Chinese supply shock. When excluding countries that imported from China there is no statistically significant relationship between regime type and proliferation, which provides further evidence that the Chinese supply shock is the main driver of our results.

A10: Excluding Countries that Imported from China

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy (All Years)	1.991 (1.513)		
Non-Democracy (Before China Shock)		1.022 (1.508)	
Non-Democracy (After China Shock)			2.493 (2.207)
Status-Seeking	0.745 (0.928)	0.685 (0.875)	0.685 (0.875)
Terrorism	1.412** (0.207)	1.411** (0.229)	1.411** (0.229)
Interstate Threats	1.874*** (0.316)	1.908*** (0.291)	1.908*** (0.291)
Logged GDP Per Capita	1.920*** (0.483)	1.944** (0.525)	1.944** (0.525)
Period 2		0.201 (0.272)	
Non-Democracy X Period 2		2.440 (3.858)	
Period 1			4.969 (6.716)
Non-Democracy X Period 1			0.410 (0.648)
Constant	4.13e-12*** (1.70e-11)	1.62e-13*** (8.66e-13)	3.27e-14*** (2.01e-13)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	4.892*** (1.302)	6.257*** (1.487)	6.257*** (1.487)
Observations	4076	4076	4076
<i>AIC</i>	56.90	59.83	59.83
<i>BIC</i>	101.1	116.7	116.7

Notes: Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01

Status-Seeking

Table A11 shows that our results related to status-seeking are robust to the use of two less strict coding rules for Early's (2014) measure of status that uses Olympic data, as well as a different measure of status from Renshon (2016) that utilizes diplomatic exchange data.³ The first alternative measure (models 1 and 5) codes a state as status-seeking if their actual number of Olympic medals is at least twice as large as their predicted number of medals. Thus, this measure eliminates the 5-medal minimum requirement used in our main measure. This alternative coding should reduce bias against smaller countries, which may have a hard time winning 5 medals even if they invest significantly in Olympic performance. The second alternative measure (models 2 and 6) codes a state as status-seeking simply if their actual number of medals exceeds their predicted number of medals. This should reduce bias against larger countries, which often are predicted to win a significant number of medals and so would have a difficult time doubling that number even if they invest significantly in Olympic performance. The third alternative measure (models 3 and 7) uses data from Renshon (2016) and specifically measures a country's status deficit compared to their relevant status community.⁴ In accordance with the logic of H3, we expect countries that have a greater status deficit to be more likely to pursue armed drones given that these countries have particularly large incentives to seek status. Finally, the last alternative measure (models 4 and 8) also uses data from Renshon (2016) and measures a country's status deficit from a global perspective. Our finding that status-seeking is a significant predictor of armed drone *pursuit* is robust to these alternative measures.⁵ Interestingly, and in accordance with H3, Renshon's (2016) measure of status also suggests that states with a greater status deficit were more likely to acquire armed drones.

³ We extend Renshon's (2016) measure of status through 2005 using updated CINC data, and then forward-fill for the remaining years.

⁴ This is the main measure of status employed by Renshon (2016) and it is continuous, unlike Early's (2014) binary measure of status.

⁵ The p-value in model 3 is just under conventional levels of significance ($p < 0.13$), but is in the expected direction and substantively large.

Table A11: Alternative Measures of Status-Seeking

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy	1.821* (0.583)	1.988** (0.654)	2.027** (0.695)	1.930* (0.649)	5.348*** (3.157)	5.273*** (3.088)	5.793*** (3.907)	5.207** (3.377)
Twice as Many Medals (Early)	2.566*** (0.816)				0.577 (0.550)			
More Medals than Expected (Early)		2.388*** (0.730)				0.505 (0.444)		
Community Status Deficit (Renshon)			1.326 (0.243)				1.539* (0.350)	
Global Status Deficit (Renshon)				1.503** (0.281)				1.551* (0.369)
Terrorism	1.509*** (0.111)	1.518*** (0.112)	1.433*** (0.113)	1.409*** (0.113)	1.342*** (0.133)	1.335*** (0.132)	1.314*** (0.119)	1.310*** (0.121)
Interstate Threats	1.304*** (0.104)	1.323*** (0.103)	1.286*** (0.0998)	1.269*** (0.102)	1.574*** (0.251)	1.582*** (0.241)	1.482** (0.267)	1.473** (0.267)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.057*** (0.251)	2.056*** (0.254)	2.053*** (0.237)	2.108*** (0.248)	1.837*** (0.285)	1.835*** (0.282)	2.031*** (0.339)	2.030*** (0.332)
Constant	3.57e-08*** (5.75e-08)	2.83e-08*** (4.74e-08)	5.64e-08*** (8.12e-08)	4.60e-08*** (6.63e-08)	2.40e-11*** (5.97e-11)	2.33e-11*** (5.83e-11)	1.50e-11*** (4.49e-11)	1.50e-11*** (4.61e-11)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.556*** (0.417)	2.588*** (0.424)	2.478*** (0.397)	2.480*** (0.396)	4.639*** (0.782)	4.664*** (0.789)	4.494*** (0.870)	4.513*** (0.896)
Observations	3826	3826	3801	3782	4086	4086	4061	4042
<i>AIC</i>	160.5	159.7	162.0	159.2	78.97	78.46	76.98	76.64
<i>BIC</i>	204.3	203.4	205.7	202.8	123.2	122.7	121.1	120.8

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Terrorism

Our results for terrorism remain robust to the use of a variable that measures the 3-year average of terrorist attacks, the number of deaths from terrorist attacks, and the 3-year average of deaths from terrorist attacks.

Table A12: Alternative Measures of Terrorism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy	1.778* (0.570)	1.610 (0.517)	1.627 (0.523)	5.327*** (3.169)	4.673** (2.865)	4.678** (2.918)
Status-Seeking	3.467*** (1.174)	3.040*** (1.091)	3.134*** (1.109)	0.588 (0.596)	0.651 (0.658)	0.623 (0.626)
Terror Attacks (3 Yr.)	1.498*** (0.112)			1.355*** (0.149)		
Terror Deaths		1.389*** (0.0915)			1.335*** (0.122)	
Terror Deaths (3 Yr.)			1.386*** (0.0982)			1.349*** (0.147)
Interstate Threats	1.315*** (0.108)	1.335*** (0.123)	1.329*** (0.121)	1.561*** (0.255)	1.538** (0.279)	1.522** (0.276)
Logged GDP Per Capita	2.008*** (0.241)	2.084*** (0.246)	2.061*** (0.244)	1.839*** (0.301)	1.962*** (0.330)	1.963*** (0.352)
Constant	3.85e-08*** (6.04e-08)	3.30e-08*** (5.36e-08)	3.25e-08*** (5.24e-08)	2.96e-11*** (7.34e-11)	1.31e-11*** (3.39e-11)	1.53e-11*** (3.89e-11)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.600*** (0.409)	2.614*** (0.448)	2.644*** (0.444)	4.562*** (0.770)	4.682*** (0.787)	4.621*** (0.790)
Observations	3822	3826	3822	4082	4086	4082
<i>AIC</i>	159.8	163.0	165.6	79.54	78.48	78.97
<i>BIC</i>	203.5	206.8	209.3	123.7	122.7	123.2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Interstate Threats

To test the robustness of our findings regarding interstate threats, we replace our rivalry variable with two alternative variables. The first measures the total number of states with whom a country shares a border.⁶ Past research has shown that neighboring states are more likely to go to war with each other⁷ and to develop long-term rivalries.⁸ Additionally, prior studies have also used this variable to measure a country's interstate threat environment.⁹ Although BORDERS is statistically significant for pursuit, it is not for acquisition. The second alternative measure we employ is the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) a state was involved in, on average, over the past 3 years.¹⁰ Since data is only available through 2010, we forward-fill for the remaining years. Results remain robust to the use of the MID variable.

Table A13: Alternative Measures of Interstate Threats

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy	1.663 (0.538)	1.979** (0.620)	6.581*** (3.958)	7.234*** (4.326)
Status-Seeking	2.415** (0.987)	2.953*** (1.068)	0.872 (0.849)	0.734 (0.676)
Terrorism	1.477*** (0.117)	1.487*** (0.124)	1.472*** (0.169)	1.376*** (0.142)
Borders	1.132*** (0.0493)		1.046 (0.0665)	
MIDs (3 Yr. Avg)		2.457** (1.101)		4.181** (2.993)
Logged GDP Per Capita	1.885*** (0.250)	2.044*** (0.236)	1.848*** (0.326)	2.020*** (0.347)
Constant	5.42e-08*** (8.95e-08)	4.53e-08*** (7.05e-08)	1.70e-10*** (6.08e-10)	1.39e-11*** (4.46e-11)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.522*** (0.474)	2.502*** (0.448)	3.971*** (1.202)	4.503*** (1.062)
Observations	3826	3818	4086	4078
AIC	155.7	160.2	87.26	82.76
BIC	199.4	203.9	131.5	126.9

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

⁶ Douglas Stinnett et al. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19 (2): 58-66.

⁷ Stuart Bremer. 1995. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (2): 309-341; John Vasquez. 1995. "Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality." *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (3): 277-293.

⁸ Jaroslav Tir and Paul Diehl. 2002. "Geographic Dimensions of Enduring Rivalries." *Political Geography* 21 (2): 263-283.

⁹ Christopher Way and Jessica Weeks. 2014. "Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (3): 705-719.

¹⁰ Glenn Palmer et al. 2015. "The MID4 Dataset, 2002-2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32 (2): 222-242.

Intrastate Threats

Table A14 analyzes how intrastate security threats affect the chance of UAV proliferation by replacing the terrorism variable with three different measures of intrastate threats. The first, used in models 1 and 4, measures the logged number of battle-related deaths from an intrastate conflict¹¹ a country suffered per year, according to version 19.1 of the UCDP/PRIO Battle-Related Deaths Dataset.¹² The second, used in models 2 and 5, takes the 3-year average of the previous variable. The third, used in models 3 and 6, measures violations of human rights by agents of a state by utilizing the Political Terror Scale.¹³ Given that these three variables are highly correlated with our main measure of terrorism, we do not include terrorism and our measures of intrastate threats in the same model in order to avoid problems of collinearity. The six models below demonstrate that intrastate security threats are statistically and substantively associated with an increased risk of armed drone pursuit and acquisition.

Table A14: Analyzing the Effect of Intrastate Threats

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition	Acquisition
Non-Democracy	1.628 (0.536)	1.637 (0.537)	1.282 (0.435)	4.866** (2.992)	4.808** (2.965)	2.884* (1.815)
Status-Seeking	2.749*** (0.987)	2.745*** (0.978)	2.543*** (0.913)	0.517 (0.524)	0.523 (0.521)	0.586 (0.574)
Intrastate Deaths	1.248*** (0.0731)			1.191** (0.105)		
Intrastate Deaths (3 Yr.)		1.206*** (0.0752)			1.166* (0.108)	
Political Terror Scale			1.874*** (0.370)			2.222** (0.787)
Interstate Threats	1.413*** (0.132)	1.422*** (0.131)	1.341*** (0.148)	1.663*** (0.304)	1.663*** (0.294)	1.480 (0.373)
Logged GDP Per Capita	1.960*** (0.232)	1.918*** (0.225)	2.308*** (0.345)	1.813*** (0.296)	1.785*** (0.291)	2.292*** (0.489)
Constant	4.86e-08*** (8.06e-08)	5.44e-08*** (9.15e-08)	4.17e-09*** (7.70e-09)	1.42e-11*** (3.71e-11)	1.70e-11*** (4.38e-11)	3.39e-13*** (1.21e-12)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.722*** (0.465)	2.755*** (0.471)	2.673*** (0.461)	4.938*** (0.796)	4.934*** (0.788)	4.990*** (0.798)
Observations	3826	3822	3816	4086	4082	4075
AIC	170.8	174.9	174.0	82.29	83.66	79.16
BIC	214.5	218.7	217.7	126.5	127.9	123.4

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

¹¹ The conflict must have resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths to be included in the dataset.

¹² Therese Pettersson, Stina Hogbladh, and Magnus Oberg. 2019. "Organized Violence, 1989-2018." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (4): 589-603.

¹³ Mark, Gibney, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, Attilio Pisanò, and Gray Barrett. 2019. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018. Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <http://www.political-terror-scale.org>.

Mixed Regimes

Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2017) argue and find statistical evidence that autocracies and democracies are more likely to pursue armed UAVs than mixed regimes.¹⁴ To see if their results hold for our updated dataset, we generate two binary variables: (1) DEMOCRACY, which equals 1 when Polity is greater than 6; and (2) AUTOCRACY, which equals 1 when Polity is less than -6. We omit mixed regimes from our models (i.e., countries that have a Polity score between -6 and 6), and thus the coefficients on DEMOCRACY and AUTOCRACY should be interpreted relative to mixed regimes. In accordance with Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2017), we generally find that autocracies are statistically and substantively more likely to pursue and acquire armed drones than mixed regimes. This makes sense given our argument, as both autocracies and mixed regimes potentially had access to Chinese exports and thus neither had a marked advantage when it came to supply-side factors, but, for the reasons outlined by Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2017), autocracies likely had greater reasons to demand armed UAVs than mixed regimes.

In contrast to Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2017), we find that there is no significant difference between democracies and mixed regimes with respect to pursuit, and democracies are actually *less* likely to acquire armed drones than mixed regimes. This can be explained by the fact that mixed regimes had a significant advantage over democracies in terms of supply-side factors. Therefore, even if democracies had greater reasons to demand armed drones than mixed regimes, they may not have had the ability to acquire them.

Table A15: Analyzing the Effect of Mixed Regimes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Pursuit	Pursuit	Pursuit	Acquisition	Acquisition
	1994-2019	1994-2010	2011-2019	1994-2019	2011-2019
Democracy	0.808 (0.301)	1.467 (1.132)	0.341** (0.179)	0.315* (0.208)	0.233* (0.189)
Autocracy	2.288* (0.999)	1.353 (1.316)	2.450 (1.398)	3.336** (1.946)	4.976*** (3.090)
Status-Seeking	3.331*** (1.112)	1.120 (0.800)	4.952*** (2.192)	0.809 (0.677)	1.116 (0.793)
Terrorism	1.560*** (0.110)	1.714*** (0.239)	1.483*** (0.128)	1.447*** (0.138)	1.448*** (0.163)
Interstate Threats	1.296*** (0.102)	1.368*** (0.125)	1.013 (0.260)	1.523*** (0.235)	1.258 (0.269)
Logged GDP Per Capita	1.951*** (0.242)	2.346*** (0.466)	1.725*** (0.287)	1.741*** (0.300)	1.470** (0.239)
Constant	6.65e-08*** (0.000000102)	8.89e-10*** (3.07e-09)	0.000000179*** (0.00000103)	6.53e-11*** (1.77e-10)	6.14e-13*** (3.49e-12)
Ancillary Parameter (p)	2.571*** (0.418)	3.387*** (1.112)	2.738* (1.554)	4.803*** (0.917)	6.741*** (1.597)
Observations	3826	2642	1184	4086	1374
AIC	156.5	89.63	65.19	76.96	56.63
BIC	206.5	136.7	105.8	127.5	98.44

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

¹⁴ Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael Horowitz. 2017. "Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles," *International Organization* 71 (2): 397-418.

UAV Proliferation Dataset & Sources

Table A16: Pursuit and Possession of Armed UAVs

Country	Years in <i>Pursuit</i> of Armed UAVs	Years in <i>Possession</i> of Armed UAVs
Algeria	2014–2017	2018–2019
Australia	2016–2019	-
Azerbaijan	2016–2019	-
Belarus	2016–2017	2018–2019
Canada	2017–2019	-
China	2008–2012	2013–2019
Czech Republic	2017–2019	-
Egypt	-	2015–2019
France	2003–2018	2019
Georgia	2012–2019	-
Germany	2013–2016	-
Greece	2004–2019	-
India	2007–2019	-
Indonesia	2017–2019	-
Iran	2010–2012	2013–2019
Iraq	2014	2015–2019
Israel	1994–2003	2004–2019
Italy	2006–2019	-
Jordan	2015	2016–2019
Kazakhstan	2012–2015	2016–2019
Mexico	2006	-
Myanmar	2013–2015	2016–2019
Nigeria	-	2014–2019
North Korea	2012–2019	-
Pakistan	2009–2014	2015–2019
Poland	2012–2019	-
Qatar	2018–2019	-
Russia	2005–2019	-
Saudi Arabia	2013–2014	2015–2019
Serbia	2018–2019	-
South Africa	2010–2013	2014–2019
South Korea	2008–2019	-
Spain	2006–2019	-
Sweden	2003–2019	-
Switzerland	2006–2019	-
Taiwan	2009–2019	-
Thailand	2019	-
Turkey	2004–2015	2016–2019

Turkmenistan	2015	2016–2019
Ukraine	2016–2018	2019
UAE	2011–2012	2013–2019
United Kingdom	2006–2007	2008–2019
United States	1999–2000	2001–2019
Uzbekistan	2013–2014	2015–2019
Yemen	2013	-

Algeria

- http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33927:algeria-evaluating-chinese-ch-4-uav&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107
- http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=1378
- <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/countries-now-armed-drones-160904150.html>
- <https://www.janes.com/article/85378/algeria-shown-to-be-operating-uae-developed-uavs>
- http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php
- <https://www.janes.com/article/88189/algerian-military-announces-armed-uav-strike>

Australia

- <http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>
- “Avalon 2017: Team Reaper launched to compete Australian armed MALE UAV requirement,” Jane's Defence Weekly, February 28, 2017.

Azerbaijan

- <http://en.azeridefence.com/azad-systems-co-production-branch-of-the-defense-industry-ministry-presents-zarba-uavs/>
- <http://ann.az/en/azerbaijan-to-start-production-of-combat-drones-next-year/>
- <https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/azerbaijan-starts-producing-zarba-armed-uav-433014/>
- https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/05/israeli-made-kamikaze-drone-spotted-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/?utm_term=.68e9a7cefb6c

Belarus

- “UMEX 2016: Burevestnik MB set for flight trials,” Jane's Int'l Defence Review, March 2016.
- “Indela Design Bureau develops VTOLUCAV,” Jane's Defence Weekly, May 25, 2017.
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