"Rethinking Reputation: When Fighting to Demonstrate Resolve Backfires"
ABSTRACT
According to the conventional wisdom among policymakers and prominent scholars, states inevitably harm their reputation for resolve by backing down. This logic has justified consequential interventions, such as the Vietnam War. I advance a new theory that argues the impact of backing down or standing firm on a state's future reputation is more conditional than commonly believed. In contrast to both the orthodox view and a set of critics who contend that reputation is unimportant in international politics, I argue that reputation matters, but that in crucial circumstances standing firm and fighting can worsen one’s reputation for resolve in the medium or long term. Standing firm rather than backing down can lead to war-weariness among a country’s public and leaders, undermining a state’s actual resolve. Foreign powers—observing these signs of war-weariness—then downgrade their assessments of the state’s resolve precisely because of its decision to stand firm in the past. I provide evidence for this novel theory through an elite experiment conducted on members of the UK Parliament and captured Iraqi government documents from the Gulf War. The most important implication of this project is that policymakers and scholars should be more skeptical about the utility of using military force than prevailing opinion indicates.
ABSTRACT
How strong is the nexus between domestic and international politics? The democratic peace contends that democracies do not fight interstate wars against each other. However, we argue the impact of domestic ideology on international politics is broader than just democracy versus nondemocracy. In addition to the democratic peace, we contend there is also a “left-wing peace” and a “right-wing peace,” where people are less likely to support the use of force against countries that share their left-wing or right-wing ideology on social and cultural issues—like immigration, abortion, and LGBTQ rights—as well as economic issues. Observers view out-ideology states as more threatening than in-ideology states due to out-group bias, which is exacerbated by increasing polarization. Two survey experiments among the American public, and an analysis of militarized interstate disputes, provide strong evidence for our argument. Respondents in our primary experiment are about 27% less likely to support punitive action—like using military force and imposing sanctions—against foreign countries that share their left-right ideology compared to ones that do not. States that have similar left-right ideologies are also about 50% less likely to engage in militarized disputes. These effects hold independent of whether a foreign country is democratic or nondemocratic, and the left/right peace coexists along with the democratic peace. Our theory connects major literatures across political science subfields, including social identity theory, political polarization, and the democratic peace. It significantly contributes to debates about whether politics “stops at the water’s edge” and the impact of polarization on political violence.
"Out of the Loop: How Dangerous is Weaponizing Automated Nuclear Systems?" Revise & Resubmit at International Organization (with Michael C. Horowitz)
[Pre-Print]
ABSTRACT
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercion, and, if so, what factors increase the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear threats? While prominent scholars like Thomas Schelling argue that nuclear brinkmanship, or the manipulation of nuclear risk, can effectively coerce adversaries, others contend nuclear weapons are not effective tools of coercion, especially coercion designed to achieve offensive and revisionist objectives. Simultaneously, there is broad debate about the incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) into military systems, especially nuclear command and control. We develop a theoretical argument that explicit nuclear threats implemented with automated nuclear launch systems are potentially more credible compared to ambiguous nuclear threats or explicit nuclear threats implemented via non-automated means. By reducing human control over nuclear use, leaders can more effectively tie their hands and thus signal resolve. While automated nuclear weapons launch systems may seem like something out of science fiction, the Soviet Union deployed such a system during the Cold War and the technology necessary to automate the use of force has developed considerably in recent years due to advances in AI. Preregistered survey experiments on an elite sample of United Kingdom Members of Parliament and two public samples of UK citizens provide support for these expectations, showing that, in a limited set of circumstances, nuclear threats backed by AI integration have credibility advantages, no matter how dangerous they may be. Our findings contribute to the literatures on coercive bargaining, weapons of mass destruction, and emerging technology.
"Hegemonic Fluctuation and Its Consequences for International Order" (with Daniel Silverman)
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"Think Globally, Act Locally: The Determinants of Local Policymakers' Support for Climate Policy" (with Sabrina B. Arias).
[Washington Post Article][Harvard Belfer Center Presentation]
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"Beyond Meating Climate Goals: Masculinity and Climate Policy Backlash" (with Christopher W. Blair and Sabrina B. Arias)
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"Learning From Yesterday, Today: Historical Analogies and Public Support for Foreign Policy Action." Revise & Resubmit at Journal of Conflict Resolution (with Christopher W. Blair and Paul Lendway)
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"Immune, Immune, Immune: Presidential Immunity and Public Support for Democratic Norms" (with John J. Chin)
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