Dovish Reputation Theory: When Fighting to Demonstrate Resolve Backfires
One of the central questions of foreign policy concerns when the use of military force is in a country’s interest. This question is what inspired me to apply to PhD programs in the first place and is the focus of my dissertation project, which argues the prevailing view that fighting bolsters a country’s reputation for resolve is incomplete and, in some cases, incorrect
The most consequential foreign policy event of my lifetime was the Iraq War. Specifically, the fact that the war’s costs in blood and treasure seemed to strongly outweigh its benefits made me curious about why countries involve themselves in costly wars not in the national interest. My dissertation project examines this topic by questioning an important rationale for initiating and continuing military conflicts: reputation for resolve. Leaders and scholars alike often argue that one reason states should engage in military conflicts is to boost or maintain their reputation for resolve in the eyes of adversaries. Presidents ranging from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton have made this argument, and Thomas Schelling went even further and claimed that reputation for resolve is, in fact, “one of the few things worth fighting over.” Famously, John McNaughton, assistant secretary of defense under Lyndon Johnson, calculated that the principal rationale, by far, for the Vietnam War was to maintain the United States’ reputation. But is it always the case that engaging in military conflict is beneficial for a country’s reputation for resolve?
While previous academic research has questioned whether fighting or backing down actually has any effect on a country’s reputation for resolve, no major study has systematically examined the possible negative consequences to a state’s reputation for resolve of engaging in military conflict. I do so in my dissertation by arguing that, under certain conditions, fighting can actually undermine a country’s reputation for resolve relative to backing down. Specifically, I contend that if a costly and/or unsuccessful war leads to backlash and ultimately war-weariness among members of the public and policymakers, then that may cause other states to downgrade their assessments of that country’s future resolve. For example, although many supporters of the Vietnam War believed that backing down would be harmful to America’s reputation for resolve relative to fighting, the intense public backlash to the conflict and the perceived “Vietnam Syndrome” that resulted was more harmful to America’s reputation for resolve than backing down would have been.
In order to substantiate this argument, my dissertation adopts a multi-method approach including experiments, large-N quantitative analysis, and historical case studies using internal government documents. There are several significant contributions my project makes. First, I posit a novel theory that has the potential to broaden debates about how military conflict affects a country’s reputation for resolve. Second, my findings suggest that countries should be more restrained about using military force to achieve national security goals than previous theories suggest. Specifically, in conflicts where countries do not have significant intrinsic interests at stake, fighting primarily for reputation may not yield the benefits proponents promise and thus may not be in a country’s national interest. Third, a lack of foreign policy restraint may undermine domestic willingness to engage in future costly conflict, meaning even proponents of an activist foreign policy should be judicious in supporting the use of force. More generally, my dissertation project suggests that interventionist grand strategies provide fewer benefits and entail greater costs than previously thought.
One of the central questions of foreign policy concerns when the use of military force is in a country’s interest. This question is what inspired me to apply to PhD programs in the first place and is the focus of my dissertation project, which argues the prevailing view that fighting bolsters a country’s reputation for resolve is incomplete and, in some cases, incorrect
The most consequential foreign policy event of my lifetime was the Iraq War. Specifically, the fact that the war’s costs in blood and treasure seemed to strongly outweigh its benefits made me curious about why countries involve themselves in costly wars not in the national interest. My dissertation project examines this topic by questioning an important rationale for initiating and continuing military conflicts: reputation for resolve. Leaders and scholars alike often argue that one reason states should engage in military conflicts is to boost or maintain their reputation for resolve in the eyes of adversaries. Presidents ranging from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton have made this argument, and Thomas Schelling went even further and claimed that reputation for resolve is, in fact, “one of the few things worth fighting over.” Famously, John McNaughton, assistant secretary of defense under Lyndon Johnson, calculated that the principal rationale, by far, for the Vietnam War was to maintain the United States’ reputation. But is it always the case that engaging in military conflict is beneficial for a country’s reputation for resolve?
While previous academic research has questioned whether fighting or backing down actually has any effect on a country’s reputation for resolve, no major study has systematically examined the possible negative consequences to a state’s reputation for resolve of engaging in military conflict. I do so in my dissertation by arguing that, under certain conditions, fighting can actually undermine a country’s reputation for resolve relative to backing down. Specifically, I contend that if a costly and/or unsuccessful war leads to backlash and ultimately war-weariness among members of the public and policymakers, then that may cause other states to downgrade their assessments of that country’s future resolve. For example, although many supporters of the Vietnam War believed that backing down would be harmful to America’s reputation for resolve relative to fighting, the intense public backlash to the conflict and the perceived “Vietnam Syndrome” that resulted was more harmful to America’s reputation for resolve than backing down would have been.
In order to substantiate this argument, my dissertation adopts a multi-method approach including experiments, large-N quantitative analysis, and historical case studies using internal government documents. There are several significant contributions my project makes. First, I posit a novel theory that has the potential to broaden debates about how military conflict affects a country’s reputation for resolve. Second, my findings suggest that countries should be more restrained about using military force to achieve national security goals than previous theories suggest. Specifically, in conflicts where countries do not have significant intrinsic interests at stake, fighting primarily for reputation may not yield the benefits proponents promise and thus may not be in a country’s national interest. Third, a lack of foreign policy restraint may undermine domestic willingness to engage in future costly conflict, meaning even proponents of an activist foreign policy should be judicious in supporting the use of force. More generally, my dissertation project suggests that interventionist grand strategies provide fewer benefits and entail greater costs than previously thought.